Risks in home-ownership by Teye, Alfred Larm et al.
2 Risks in home-ownership: a perspective on the
Netherlands
Published as: Teye, A.L., de Haan, J., Elsinga, M.G., Bondinuba, F.K., Gbadegesin, J.W. (2017). “Risks in home-ownership: a perspective
on The Netherlands”. International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, Volume 10(4), pp. 472-4882.
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this
version to appear in A+BE | Architecture and the Built Environment (ISSN 2212-3202 |
TU Delft Library). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald
Group Publishing Limited.
Abstract
Purpose: Risk in home-ownership frommortgage providers’ perspectives within the
euro zone has receivedmore attention than individual home owner’s perspectives in
the literature following the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007/2008. The purpose of this paper is
to explore the risk factors in home-ownership from the individual household’s
perspectives within the owner-occupied housing sector of the Netherlands.
Design/methodology/approach: The paper adopted a broader review of extant literature
on the diﬀerent concepts and views on risk in home-ownership. These concepts are
uniﬁed into a framework that enhances our understanding of the perceived
sophisticated risk within the owner-occupied sector in the Netherlands.
Findings: From the perspective of the home owner, twomain types of risks were
identiﬁed: mortgage default and property price risk. The paper has unearthed a
quantum number of factors which underline the above risks. Themortgage default risk
factors include the initial amount of mortgage loan taken out, the future housing
expenses and the income development of the owner-occupier. Family disintegration is
also identiﬁed as one of themain causes of mortgage default in the Netherlands.
Property price risk is inﬂuenced by income, interest rates and conditions in the social
and private rental sectors.
Research limitations/implications: Findings of the paper are based on review of the
extant literature in the context of the Dutch housingmarket. Possible rigorous
situational analysis using other tools are recommended for further research.
Originality/value: This paper contributes to themuch needed body of knowledge in the
owner-occupied sector and provides a better understanding of risk in home ownership
from the individual perspectives.
Keywords: Housingmarkets, Risk, Dutch housingmarket, Home ownership, Mortgage
providers, Owner-occupation
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.............................................................................................................................
§ 2.1 Introduction
.............................................................................................................................
Subsequent to the subprimemortgage crisis of the USA, risk in the owner-occupied
sector has received extensive consideration in the housing literature (Aalbers, 2010;
McGreal et al., 2009; Bardhan et al., 2012; Kramer, 2010; Cano Fuentes et al., 2013;
Aalbers, 2015). While these prior eﬀorts shed light on the spectrum of risks in home-
ownership, the arguments for home-ownership has often been skewedmostly towards
the perspectives of the ﬁnancial institution supplying credits for the home ﬁnancing.
The debates and arguments on the pitfalls from the owners’ position are quite limited
in extant literature. It is clear nonetheless that the risks for the credit providers could
beminimised if steps are taken to understand andmanage the exposures at the level
of the individual home buyers. Borrowing on “predatory terms”, for instance, could be
avoided if households are informed on the nature of the associated risks they are likely
to encounter.
It is centrally advocated in this paper therefore that attention be given to the risks in
the owner-occupier sector within the level and perspectives of the households. The
paper provides an overview of risks in home-ownership from the viewpoint of the
homeowner, especially, those ﬁnancing their purchase withmortgage loans. Two
inherent risk factors are identiﬁed: repayment and property price risks. While
repayment risk pertains to mortgage repayment, property price risk consists of loss of
investment capital as a result of decline in house prices within the period of concern.
Also, mortgage repayment default depends on three factors: the initial debt level,
income and cost development after the loan agreement has been contracted. For
property price risk, the factors are quite varied and have to do with themultiplicity
features which inﬂuence the development of house prices.
The approach of this paper is mainly to oﬀer a careful discussion of the various risk
types, their eﬀects and causalities by unifying the diﬀerent concepts as dispersed in
both academic and non-academic literature into a concise framework. Also, the paper
clariﬁed the nature of risk in the owner-occupied sector from the individual
household’s perspectives that constitute the larger majority who are mostly
non-professionals. It gives brief background to home-ownership in the Netherlands,
discusses general views on default and property price risk as well as the factors
heightening the probability of their occurrence. The consequence of default and
property price decline are also discussed in the light of the Dutch and concludes with
suggestions on reducing the risks in home-ownership and how to create awareness
amongst households in the Netherlands.
.............................................................................................................................
§ 2.2 Growth of home-ownership in the Netherlands
.............................................................................................................................
Growth of home-ownership in the Netherlands has been steady over the decades.
Between 1971 and 2012, the home-ownership rate increased from 35.1% to about
60.0% as shown in Figure 2.1. The Dutch government’s stimulation of the
owner-occupied sector through income tax deductions and later by the National
Mortgage Guarantee (NMG) scheme played an important role in the above
achievement. Other factors include the investment and social beneﬁt which
homeowners accrue in the Netherlands. Over the years, the Dutch’s perception of
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FIGURE 2.1 Evolution of home-ownership (per cent of total housing stock)
Source: ABF Research B.V (2010), Eurostat
home-ownership had shifted from just having roof over one’s head to having some
independence from landlords and ﬁnding a way to foster deeper connection with their
relations and family (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2007). Somewhat, there appears to be the
idea to “immortalise” marital relationships with joint home-ownership that usually
drive most people to buy private homes at the time when they are starting up their
marital relationships (Neuteboom and Horsewood, 2006; Toussaint and Elsinga,
2007). To others, home-ownership gives a wider choice and freedom to adapt the
residential property to amore fulﬁlling and a self-suiting style (Elsinga, 1998;
Toussaint and Elsinga, 2007). Such liberty to adjust the external features of the
dwelling is generally not available in the rental sector.
From an investment perspective, Dutch households ﬁnd home-ownership as an
instrument that can be used to build equity and/or earn additional income to augment
the regular pay cheque or pension (Boelhouwer, 2002; Haﬀner, 2008; Toussaint and
Elsinga, 2010; Toussaint, 2013). Such practice evolves around buying an extra home
to rent out in the private rental market and later selling it entirely when enough equity
has been built. Minority also rent out a room or two in their own apartment. The ﬁscal
treatment wheremortgage interest payments are deducted from income tax also oﬀers
extra saving opportunity onmortgage outlays (Boelhouwer, 2002; Elsinga, 1998).
Many have argued that, “when you rent, your money just ﬂows away, but when you buy,
it comes back to you and you can build up capital” (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2007, pp.
182). The reference here relates to the tax-deductibility which is discussed in the next
section.
§ 2.2.1 National mortgage guarantee
.............................................................................................................................
From themid-1980s, the ambition of the Dutch government shifted towards
home-ownership in the quest to shed part of the responsibility for providing housing
for the population. Various policies were engineered to fulﬁl this new vision of the
government. One such regulation is the rebranding and reconstruction of the
municipal guarantees into what is now known as the Dutch National Mortgage
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Guarantee [Nationale Hypotheek Garantie (NHG) in the Netherlands]. The NHG was
founded in 1993 and currently administered by the voluntary public foundation called
Home-ownership Guarantee Fund [Waarborgfonds EigenWoningen (WEW)]. It has the
full backing of themunicipalities and the central government. The Fund primarily
thrives on a premium on themortgage amount received from the borrowers (CPB,
2013; Van Leeuwen and Bokeloh, 2012). The premium is presently 1.0% but used to
be 0.36% in the early years of the Fund, 0.28% for 2005-2006 and 0.85% in other
previous years.
The aim of the Fund is to stimulate home-ownership by lowering themortgage
threshold for young and lower income groups. The guarantee also serves as a safety net
for those entering into foreclosure for reasons such as divorce, job redundancy, ill
health and other unforeseeable events. If a homeowner is able to demonstrate
faithfulness, he/she is relieved from the duty to pay back to the guarantee fund.
Despite the above, Dutchmortgage banks are usually hesitant in advancing credits to
individuals with weak ﬁnancial circumstances. However, when a borrower signed up to
the NHG, the credit institutions could grant loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
exceeding 100 per cent. Although themaximum LTV is expected to be reduced to 100
per cent by 2018 and subsequently to about 85 per cent later (DNB, 2014), the current
higher LTV ratio facilitated by the NHG generally enhances the ownership rate
particularly among the lower income and younger age groups. These social classes
ordinarily would not qualify for mortgage loans. In addition, the banks grant discount
on themortgage interest rate up to about 0.6 per cent for those who signed unto the
NHG. This also oﬀers most Dutch people an extra ﬁnancial relief, whichmotivates them
to consider home-ownership (Fitzsimons, 2013).
Another way the scheme encourages home-ownership is the impetus it gives ﬁnancial
institutions to readily advance credit. Because of the backing of the central government
and themunicipalities, there is assurance that any credits in default will eventually be
recovered. This means that the (credit) risk of the banks is reduced and they would not
need to hold large regulatory or solvency capital. The banks, consequently, could issue
asmany loans as possible so that inaccessibility to mortgage loans is not much of a
concern if the borrower opts to sign unto the scheme (CPB, 2013; Fitzsimons, 2013).
However, in the opinion of Elsinga et al. (2014), since the reduction of themaximum
LTV ratio in 2013, it has became extremely diﬃcult for the younger and lower income
groups in the Netherlands to enter into the owner-occupied sector.
§ 2.2.2 Tax deductibility
.............................................................................................................................
Since the nineteenth century, Dutch homeowners have been enjoying the advantage of
fully deductingmortgage interest rates from income tax (Haﬀner, 2002). This began
with the private landlords but was later extended to individuals in support of
home-ownership (Rouwendal, 2007). In its current form, the income tax deductions
give homeowners the opportunity to recover part of their mortgage expenses equal to
the product of themarginal tax rate and the gross interest on themortgage loan. The
marginal tax rate normally ranges from 42 to 52 per cent, depending on the income
level (Van Leeuwen and Bokeloh, 2012; Rouwendal, 2007).
The generosity of the tax regime has a number of inﬂuences on the Dutch housing
market in many ways. First, the income tax deductions lowers the cost of mortgage and
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this provides a huge stimulation for home-ownership in the Netherlands. It is however
debated that the tax rebate partly contributes to house price increases (Boelhouwer
et al., 2004; Toussaint and Elsinga, 2007). Second, the tax regime hasmade strong
inﬂuence onmortgage servicing in the Netherlands. Several mortgage products were
engineered purposely to optimise the beneﬁts from the tax deductibility (Boelhouwer,
2002; Rouwendal, 2007). These products were associated with the so-called
interest-only and endowmentmortgages in the Dutchmortgagemarket. Third, the tax
regulation inﬂuences the borrowing behaviour of Dutch homeowners. For instance, the
wealthy in the Dutch society who could purchase a dwelling out-rightly would rather
acquire amortgage. This is due to the construction of the tax systemwhich enables the
rich to get the largest savings (Van Leeuwen and Bokeloh, 2012).
Following the reforms in 2013, however, the ﬁscal tax deductibility has been restricted
to only amortising (or classical mortgage) loans with at least an annual redemption.
Whereas homeowners with origination date before January 2013 still continue to enjoy
the beneﬁts of the old tax structure, ﬁrst-time buyers are constrained by the current
regulations. The implication therefore is that the cost of mortgage has increased
signiﬁcantly for ﬁrst-time buyers, making them quite hesitant to enter into themarket.
Also, the production of interest-only loans has reduced substantially since they are no
longer deductible from income tax and have become less appealing to housing
consumers.
§ 2.2.3 Risk attitude prior to the crisis
.............................................................................................................................
Until the crisis, Dutch homeowners had focusedmostly on the generosity of the ﬁscal
tax deductibility which practically enabled them to recoup a substantial percentage of
their mortgage repayments. There was little perception of the risks associated with
home-ownership in the Dutch society. This fact was acknowledged by Van Gent in his
chapter in (Doling and Elsinga, 2006) edition. He emphatically noted that owner
occupation was being championed in the Netherlands with the assumption that it will
automatically generate asset gains for individuals and greater responsibility within the
Dutch society. The revelations in a survey by Toussaint and Elsinga (2007) were even
more striking. They argue that as at 2006 (the year of survey), many homeowners were
not much aware of any risks nor did they dread any event which possibly might aﬀect
them as homeowners. Generally, respondents of that survey felt they weremuch
secured except concerns they had with regards to ill health and policy changes that
might aﬀect their tax break.
Certainly, the story changed after the 2007/2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. The inherent
risk becamemore apparent after the crisis as house prices declined bymore than 25
per cent and the number of homeowners in arrears has increased considerably (see
DNB, 2014, Figure 2.2 and 2.5). The impacts of these price declines and growing
defaults on ﬁnancial institutions and on the government purse have been substantially
discussed and debated (De Vries, 2010; Brounen and Eichholtz, 2012; Van Leeuwen
and Bokeloh, 2012; Elsinga et al., 2014). On the other hand, the implications for the
individual homeowner are usually overlooked.
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FIGURE 2.2 Auction foreclosure sales in the Netherlands
Source: Kadaster
.............................................................................................................................
§ 2.3 General overview of risk in home-ownership
.............................................................................................................................
Generally, extant literature identiﬁes risks in home-ownership from twomain
categories of factors. The ﬁrst is often referred to as payment or default risk which deals
with the ability of homeowners to pay themonthly mortgage expenses. The second has
to do with volatility of house prices and is usually termed as property price risk.
Depending on the scale of these risks, however, there is also systemic risk which could
develop to aﬀect the entire housingmarket. This systemic risk and its consequences
typically extend beyond the individual homeowners (Stephens, 2006). However, the
discussions would be conﬁned to that of payment and property price risk.
§ 2.3.1 Payment risk
.............................................................................................................................
Due to the huge ﬁnancial consequences involved, mortgage default is one of themost
signiﬁcant risk factors in home-ownership. Formally, default or repayment risk is used
in reference to the risk arising from homeowner inability to live up to themortgage
repayment obligations. To reduce such risk, mortgage lenders normally set the initial
LTV and the loan-to-income (LTI) ratios to levels they believed are bearable for the
homeowner. Particularly, if the LTV and LTI ratios are very low, the hope is that the
default probability will be minimal. However, Neuteboom (2008) argue that these
initial lending conditions do not fully reveal occurrence of default in the future. In this
author’s estimation, the cause of default rests with events occurrences during the
tenure of themortgage which do not necessarily have any bearing with the initial
statistics collected.
Causes of default in repayment of mortgage
There are two distinct hypothesis underlyingmortgage default, which according to
many (Lambrecht et al., 1997; Yang et al., 1998; Neuteboom, 2008), are the equity
and ability to pay hypotheses. In the equity hypothesis, homeowners default on the
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basis of comparison between the costs and returns inherent in the continuation or
termination of a mortgage contract (Neuteboom, 2008; Kim, 2015; Chan et al., 2016;
Connor and Flavin, 2015; Nield, 2015). In other words, default is an outcome of a
thoughtful reﬂection in the sense that if mortgage repayment were to be continuing, it
would bemainly due to the anticipated proﬁt. In the USA, for example, where at the
time of foreclosure, homeowners are not held liable for residual debts, the choice to
default onmortgage obligations is much appealing when the incidence of negative
equity looms or is envisaged. Basically, owner-occupiers motivated by investment
reasons fall under this hypothesis, as they are mostly inclined to default not because
they cannot aﬀord but for reasons that defaulting presents a gain in disguise. That
notwithstanding, the recent hike in the use of credit reports and concerns by
individuals to maintain a clean credit history should gradually restrain this issue of
reneging on purpose.
For countries where there is right of recourse and homeowners can be held liable for
residual debts, the equity hypothesis ceases to operate. In such environments, the
problem of monthly expenses being too high in relations to the household income is
more important. According to Boelhouwer et al. (2005), thesemonthly expenses may
depend on themortgage interests and deposits, maintenance cost, insurance
premiums, taxes and inﬂation rate (high inﬂation eventually depletes themortgage
loan in real terms). Theymay also be aﬀected by the type of mortgage loan and the
policies on tax deductions
Many authors also considered the issue of personal mismanagement and how
household ﬁnancial revenues are managed instead of the inﬂow of income
(Neuteboom, 2008; Kloth, 2005). In the account of (Andrews and Sánchez, 2011;
Neuteboom and Horsewood, 2006), the phenomenon of incomemisappropriation is
generally found to associate with young people and the less educated inmost of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries studied
by the authors. It is argued that such class of people may have problems planning and
estimating future expenses or possibly end up trading one debt for another in amanner
which could be referred to as “mis-prioritisation” in servicing debts. Generally, it is also
observed that homeowners who hold other non-housing debts along withmortgage
aremuch constrained when it comes to repayment (Neuteboom and Horsewood,
2006). As a rule of thumb, it could be postulated that the higher the periodic
debt-service ratio, the greater the exposure to payment problems. This as well implies
naturally that households with lower income and those with subprime or variable
interest rate mortgage loans are muchmore vulnerable to payment diﬃculties.
Consequences of default in repayment of mortgage
From the individual homeowner perspective, payment diﬃculties have three
progressive dimensions and stages. It begins with themortgage costs increasingly
becoming burdensome. Subsequently, arrears develop and potentially this often leads
to repossession (Neuteboom, 2003). The consequences of repossession or better put
as dispossession, on the other hand, span beyond the individual homeowner. The
owner-occupier usually suﬀers loss of the investment capital and could also fall into
residual debts. Psychological problems could also develop as a result of one losing the
property. The eﬀect of psychological problems could even bemuch adverse. There
could equally be reduction in performance at work and family breakdowns particularly
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where some have resort to the use of home-ownership as ameans of consolidating
marital relationships.
Also, as evidenced in the 2007/2008 crisis, repossession could trigger systemic risk
with adverse implications for the ﬁnancial system and economic stability (Stephens,
2006; Colin and Richardson, 2014). In particular, where mortgage defaulters can freely
walk away from residual debts at the time of foreclosure such as in the USA, it is
probable that lenders will suﬀer signiﬁcant loses frommortgages in negative equity.
Even in situations where borrowers are liable for residual debts on negative equity, it is
not always practically possible to retrieve the last penny (Neuteboom, 2008; Van der
Heijden et al., 2011). There are lengthy legal procedures involved whichmay cause the
mortgage debt to deplete in value through high inﬂation. Personal bankruptcy laws
may equally aﬀect eﬀorts to recover loans in default. The national government would
normally also suﬀer if repossessions are intensiﬁed. The government in such situations
would have to increase social beneﬁts and accommodate evicted households.
Substantial sums would further have to be spent on bank bailouts to prevent
bankruptcy and redundancy. In 2009, for instance, the Dutch government expended
almost 48 billion Euros on bank bailouts alone (Van der Heijden et al., 2011).
Furthermore, if foreclosure persists, the number of dwellings available for sale may
eventually increase. This could aﬀect house prices as supply grows from the
intensifying repossession rates (DiPasquale, 1999; Baker, 2008). In some places also,
bad omen are often associated to repossess properties whichmakes their resale
extremely diﬃcult unless they are highly discounted (DiPasquale, 1999; Boelhouwer
and VanWeesep, 1988).
§ 2.3.2 Property price risk
.............................................................................................................................
Besides the credit or (re)payment risk associated with owner-occupation, the other risk
is property price risk which others also referred to as equity price risk or simply asset
risk. In the ﬁnancial literature, asset risk is normally used in relation to the volatility or
variation of the asset price over time (Crouhy et al., 2006; Crouhy, 2010; Jin and
Ziobrowski, 2011). In the context of housing research, it is mostly restricted to the risk
inherent in the decrease of the property price. Essentially, there are at least four
reasons why decrease in house price is (or should be) of much concern to the
homeowner. Themost comprehensible and well-known is negative equity – the
situation where the price of the property falls below the outstanding loan. The other
reasons are immobility, loss of investment capital and general insecurities related to
the collapse of house prices (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2007; Phang, 2010). The general
dynamics of property price developments is discussed below.
Dynamics of house price development
Given the adverse consequences of decreasing house prices, it is important to
understand the factors which underpin price development in themarket. In general,
the extent literature acknowledges the existence of some equilibrium price around
which themarket constantly adjusts itself (Case and Shiller, 1988; Malpezzi, 1999).
Prior research (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Case and Shiller, 1988; Malpezzi,
1999; Ambrose et al., 2013) has therefore studied long-term eﬀect of price
equilibrium in the housingmarket. In view of these prior ﬁndings, house prices are
thought to converge to a long-term equilibrium level which periodically gets corrected
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in reaction to changes in the fundamental price determinants. Highly inspired by
microeconomic theory, the equilibrium hypothesis considers that prices are driven by
factors fundamental to demand and supply (Malpezzi, 1999; De Vries, 2010;
DiPasquale, 1999). Here, demand is mostly driven by factors such as income, rent,
demographic features, mortgage interest rates, tax structure, amongst others
(Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Ortalo-Magné et al., 2000; Muellbauer and
Murphy, 1997). On the supply side, the determinants are construction cost, land
regulations and availability of old homes arising from forced sales, conversion of rental
dwellings and sales by existing owner-occupiers (Reichert, 1990; Muellbauer and
Murphy, 1997; DiPasquale, 1999; Baker, 2008).
Contrary to the equilibrium hypothesis, prices have increasingly demonstrated trends
quite unexplainable by themarket fundamentals (Case and Shiller, 1988). In
explaining the phenomenon, it is argued that ﬂuctuations from the equilibrium price
level are temporal and signify inﬂuences from external factors or exogenous shocks
(Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Andrews, 2010). Furthermore, it is also believed
that depending on themarket forces, these shocks may gradually fade away or have a
long-lasting eﬀect on future prices to possibly create new price equilibrium. Other
scholars also focus on explaining the factors behind this shift in price equilibrium. Case
and Shiller (1988), for instance, argue that psychological eﬀects and consumer
expectations largely underpin house price booms. As explained by these authors,
expectation of owner-occupiers is usually thought to result in creating excessive
demand so that due to rigidity of housing supply, sharp increase in prices become
eminent.
In general, consumer expectations tend to aﬀect prices in two ways: either there is
upward swing in prices because of excess demand or prices decline as a result of
consumer withdrawal. As also noted by Boelhouwer et al. (2004), consumers are
usually responsive to the prevailing price settings at hand. In anticipation, that price
might continue to rise, there are those whomight want to buy to avoid extremely high
and unaﬀordable future prices as well as others whomight venture buying to sell and
make proﬁt from future price appreciations. The reaction of home buyers to future
prices decline is contrary, as there is always a withdrawal in such situations. These
consumer reactionsmay create the situation where demand becomes volatile and
subsequently induces instability in house prices, particularly because of the lag in
housing supply. These dynamics of demand and supply disparities may also explain a
greater percentage of the boom and burst in the housingmarket (Case and Shiller,
1988; Reichert, 1990; Levin andWright, 1997; Dröes, 2011).
Other researchers (Muellbauer andMurphy, 1997; Poterba et al., 1991; Boelhouwer
and Neuteboom, 2003; Aalbers, 2008; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011; Andrews, 2010;
Andrews and Sánchez, 2011; Galati and Teppa, 2013) have also recognised the
signiﬁcant contribution of government policy to the development of house prices.
These authors attribute high volatility of house prices partly to the deregulations and
reregulations of themortgagemarket. The case of tax reforms, down payment and
income constraints relating to LTV and LTI ratios are particularly noteworthy. As
emphasised by Reichert (1990), though income and employment may aﬀect house
prices depending on the regional features, when it comes tomortgage interest rates,
the response is uniform across board. Andrews and Sánchez (2011), on the same issue
also found that there is a general upwardmovements of house prices when tax
treatments are somehow generous.
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Housing/property bubbles
Property price bubble is an important phenomenon in house price development in the
housingmarket. The term bubble is normally used to describe the dynamics of house
price movements where there is a very high percentage increase in prices (boom) over a
period, followed by a sharp decline (bubble-burst). Formation of a bubble usually
begins with a “normal” price appreciation as a result of “an innovation” in the housing
market until prices have reached an unsustainable level by the very innovation that
seemed to have ignited the upward price adjustments. For example, it is mostly
believed that the recent US house price bubble began as a result of innovations in the
mortgagemarket where incredible number of mortgage products became available to
homeowners but were not well managed (Baker, 2008; Mizen, 2008; Aalbers, 2009b).
In other countries including the Netherlands, it is mostly considered that the boomwas
initiated by the comparatively high LTV ratio, newmortgage products and generous tax
rebates.
Historically, most house price booms had ended in bubble-bursts with equal
persistence according to Agnello and Schuknecht (2011). The implication is that
though the length of the boommight not be readily known, once it sets in, there is a
high probability that prices might sharply decline in the future. Put in another context,
house price bubbles are highly fragile. The phenomenon nonetheless has allures. It is
normally during those seasons of booms in which homeowners seem to take on the
highest risk by taking large loans for expensive homes. Furthermore, issues such as
over-valuation, predatory lending and other underhandmarket practices are mostly
prevalent during price booms (Case and Shiller, 1988; Cecchetti, 2006; Aalbers, 2008).
Remarkably, until the bursting phase, bubbles are usually not noticed and one of its
distinctive features is that bubbling prices are usually driven by factors other than
market fundamentals to which some researchers allude to psychological and
speculative reasons (Case and Shiller, 1988; Shiller, 1990; Stiglitz, 1990; Flood and
Hodrick, 1990; Abraham and Hendershott, 1996). For example, Flood and Hodrick
(1990) and (Stiglitz, 1990), deﬁne bubble as a phenomenon which occurs when
current price increments are mainly due to expectation of high future selling prices
which are unsubstantiated by themarket fundamentals. Empirically, bubbles are
modelled as the percentage change between the equilibrium andmarket price levels
(Flood and Hodrick, 1990; Abraham and Hendershott, 1996) with the boom(burst)
phase implied by the instances wheremarket prices persistently exceed (fall below) the
equilibrium level.
.............................................................................................................................
§ 2.4 Risk proﬁle of Dutch housingmarket
.............................................................................................................................
This section focuses attention on the risks in home-ownership in the context of the
Netherlands. Here, a consideration is given to the outlook of risk and the causative
factors in relation to payment risk, property price and systemic risks.
§ 2.4.1 Payment risk
.............................................................................................................................
The recent mortgage foreclosure rate in the Netherlands as in Figure 2.2, has shown
quite an increasing trend. Family breakdown, and divorce particularly, has been
identiﬁed as themain factor behind the current upsurge in the foreclosure rate
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FIGURE 2.3 Yearly number of divorce in the Netherlands
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)
(Van Leeuwen and Bokeloh, 2012; Van Dalen et al., 2013). The number of divorces has
been very high as can be seen from Figure 2.3; however, as noted earlier, the general
societal trend has been that most Dutch citizens enter into home-ownership at the
beginning of their marital relationships at which time also their combined income
qualiﬁes them to access largemortgage loans. The challenges then arise, where in the
event of a breakup of thesemarital relationships, a single income would no longer
become adequate to service themonthly housing expenses. Interestingly, however,
due to themuniﬁcent social security and compulsory unemployment insurance for
permanent Dutch workers, job redundancy usually does not lead tomortgage
delinquency in the Netherlands (Neuteboom and Horsewood, 2006). Moreover, there
have been some concerns about the risks of the interest-only loans and whether they
contribute to the repossession rate in the Netherlands (Van Leeuwen and Bokeloh,
2012). A careful study of the nature of these products reveals that, though they
motivate people to taking up larger sum of mortgage loans, their impacts on payment
problemsmay not be that pronounced except there is an issue of divorce or redundancy
(NVB, 2014). They rather give home owners the beneﬁt of paying lower monthly
expenses.
Despite the tremendous increase in the foreclosure rate, in terms of numbers and
actual percentages, it should be argued that the number of forced sales in the
Netherlands is quite low. In 2013, for instance, the total forced sales as a percentage of
all transactions is only around 2.0 per cent (Van Dalen et al., 2013). Compared to other
European Union (EU) countries, the Dutch foreclosure rate has generally been one of
the lowest and falls only behind that of Sweden and Denmark (Fitzsimons, 2013). This
is somewhat interesting especially when the Netherlands has continuously been
cautioned for the high level of mortgage debts as shown in Figure 2.4. A number of
factors account for the low foreclosure rates. First, though the ﬁnancial crisis had hit
hard on the Dutch labour market with unemployment rate growing from an average of
4.9 per cent before crisis to an average of about 8.5 per cent after the crisis, the
generous unemployment and social beneﬁts in the Netherlands seem to have provided
suﬃcient cover against mortgage default as discussed above. Permanent workers in
the Netherlands have unemployment insurance schemes which pay about 70-90 per
cent of their last month salary up to 38months (Neuteboom and Horsewood, 2006;
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FIGURE 2.4 Dutchmortgage debt as a percentage of GDP (1998-2010)
Source: Database for Institutional comparisons in Europe (CESifo DICE)
Cano Fuentes et al., 2013). The social security system is rather generous and
guarantees income of unlimited duration. The redundant homeowner could therefore
access such social beneﬁt as long as it can be proven that the cost of staying in one’s
own home is not more than renting a new dwelling (Fitzsimons, 2013). Beside these,
Dutchmortgagors commonly tend to show very good repayment behaviour. This could
partly be attributed to the fact that the banks do have full right to recourse. At
foreclosure, they are able, by law, to conﬁscate the dwelling and other assets the
defaulter may have as well. Personal bankruptcy laws are also very strict at enforcement
so that it is not too easy to abdicate responsibility for the debt in any event.
§ 2.4.2 Property price risk
.............................................................................................................................
As depicted in Figure 2.5, although the average property price development in the
Netherlands has generally shown an increasing trend, there have also been seasons in
which prices have fallen rather sharply. Between 1978 and 1985, for instance, there
was a substantial price decrease of almost 29 per cent. Following the recent global
ﬁnancial crisis, there have also been persistent decline in house prices between 2008
and 2013 of about 25% (see Figure 2.5 and 2.6). Pertaining to the recent price decline,
eﬀects of the crisis and the Dutch government reregulation of the ﬁscal tax
deductibility have generally been themost signiﬁcant factors. First, the crisis had not
only impacted on unemployment, but also, the credit crunch which had aﬀectedmost
Dutch banks because of their international orientation had led to a tightening up of
mortgage provisions in the Netherlands. This has partly restricted access to mortgage
and consequently decreased the number of new home purchases (Elsinga et al., 2014).
Second, following government’s review of the tax incentives for homeowners, the cost
of home-ownership for new buyers has signiﬁcantly increased. Together, the eﬀect of
these factors has been an apparent drop in consumer conﬁdence and demand for new
homes which have subsequently aﬀected the price development in themarket in the
Netherlands. Actual loss on sales during these periods of decline to some extent is only
suﬀered to various degrees by those whomade purchases close to the peak in 2008. As
demonstrated in the Figure 2.5, purchases before 2003, for example, would still accrue
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FIGURE 2.5 Average Dutch house prices from 1965 to 2014 (in 1,000s)
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FIGURE 2.6 Change in average house purchase prices (in percentage)
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)
substantial proﬁts if sales weremade during themeltdown (see Sommervoll and
de Haan, 2014, Figure 2.6).
§ 2.4.3 Systemic risk
.............................................................................................................................
As noted earlier, a general concern for the Dutch economy has been the very high
mortgage debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. However, in contrast to the loan
repayment, the response has been quite good with forced sales at only around 2 per
cent, which some analysts argue that there is really not much cause to despair. To
Van Leeuwen and Bokeloh (2012), for instance, there seems to be rather toomuch
focus on the debt side than the equally high assets held by Dutch households.
According to these authors, the Dutch havemore assets than debts. By these authors’
estimation as at 2011, for every one euro in debt, Dutch households equally have in
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reserve 1.76 and 2.41 euros of real estate and ﬁnancial assets, respectively. Mostly,
however, these assets are tied up in pension and insurance reserves. There is also a
large amount of equity stored up in residential real estate which should probably be the
concern because property prices are never guaranteed. This should be especially
important for NHG which insures against residual debts since any signiﬁcant price
decline along with large number of foreclosures could be quite distressful. Of course,
there have been concerns recently about the rising foreclosure rates which had
eventually led to an increment of the premium from 0.85 to 1.0 per cent.
.............................................................................................................................
§ 2.5 Summary and conclusion
.............................................................................................................................
From the perspective of the homeowner, twomain types of risks are identiﬁed:
mortgage default and property price risk. The discussions have unearthed a quantum
number of factors which underline these risks. Particular to default, these factors relate
to the initial amount of mortgage loan taken out, the future housing expenses and the
income development of the owner-occupier. In the Dutch case, family disintegration is
identiﬁed as one of themain causes of mortgage default. As a recent phenomenon,
most people enter into home-ownership at the start of their marital relationships.
However, problems arise when those households are broken apart and themortgage
cost become too high for a single individual. On property price risk, the factors
discussed are those which generally determine property price development andmainly
thought to command demand and supply of owner-occupier dwellings. These factors
include income levels, interest rates and conditions in the social and private rental
sectors. With respect to the Netherlands, the recent price decline traces its roots to the
ﬁnancial crisis. The situation further deteriorated by the introduction of a new code of
conduct for lenders and the government’s revision of the tax deductibility which led to
an increase in themonthly expenses of home ownership.
The study also discussed the consequences of default and declining property prices in
which the ultimate problem is foreclosure in combination with negative equity leading
to residual debts. For the Dutch households, this implies a loss of investment capital
whichmay subsequently lead to psychological problems. Property price declinemay
also trigger negative equity, immobility, loss of investment capital and insecurity. More
importantly, when default occurs on extremely large scale at the same time with
property prices sharply declining, there is the possibility that the ﬁnancial systemmight
experience systemic instability. For the Netherlands, this risk is insured by the NHG to
some extent. In sum, the central theme advanced in the paper is awareness of the
individual about the nature of the risks in home-ownership. To enhance the
understanding andmanagement of these risks at the household level, a possible
considerationmight be a thorough education by lenders on the risks of themortgage
products they oﬀer. Future research could therefore consider assessing the individuals’
future complications and counselling on strategies to minimise the risks.
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